Opinion | Good policies, wrong people: Why reform stalls?

2026-03-25 - 19:21

Public debates on reform tend to focus on policy: what should change, which laws should be amended, and which programs should be introduced. Yet experience within state institutions suggests that this is not the real starting point. A more fundamental question comes first: who is entrusted to implement these policies, and on what basis are they selected? This is where reform quietly begins to fail. Reform does not fail because policies are inherently flawed. It fails because they are often assigned to the wrong people. This is not a theoretical argument. It is a pattern I observed firsthand while serving as an adviser at Egypt’s Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, and later as a member of the Egyptian Senate. Across both executive and legislative environments, one lesson stood out: the quality of ideas is never enough. Outcomes are determined by who implements them, how they understand their role, and the institutional environment in which they operate. Many states do not suffer from a shortage of policy ideas. They suffer from a deficit in selection. In theory, appointments should be based on merit, competence, and functional suitability. In practice, other considerations often take precedence: trust, proximity, manageability, and political or personal reassurance. Competence does not disappear, but it loses its decisive role. Over time, this produces something more serious than isolated inefficiency. It creates a selection logic that reshapes institutions themselves. The distinction between those who fit a role and those who merely occupy it gradually fades. In multiple cases, reform initiatives were technically sound, yet assigned to individuals whose background did not match the complexity of the task. The result was not failure in design, but stagnation in execution. Good policies, in such contexts, produce limited outcomes or fail to materialise at all. At this point, a deeper shift occurs. Competence itself can become a source of discomfort. Capable individuals tend to be more independent, more analytical, and less willing to comply blindly. In systems that prioritise stability over professional rigour, these traits may be perceived as risks rather than assets. In their place, another value emerges: containability. Institutions begin to reward those who adapt to the system more than those who can meaningfully improve it. This is not merely an administrative issue. It affects the state’s ability to produce real outcomes. The problem becomes especially visible in strategic sectors. My work on institutional reform, including discussions on restructuring Egypt’s cultural sector, has reinforced a critical point: culture is not peripheral. It shapes public awareness, societal judgment, and what can be described as a form of cognitive national security. When such sectors are managed through accommodation, symbolic positioning, or recycled weakness rather than genuine competence, the consequences extend far beyond institutional boundaries. Real reform does not begin with slogans. Nor does it begin with organisational charts. It begins when the state recognises that managing talent is not a bureaucratic luxury; it is a condition for resilience and renewal. This requires clear professional pathways, credible evaluation mechanisms, and a firm distinction between personal trust and professional merit. When these are blurred, stability does not increase; decline simply becomes slower and less visible. If reform is to be taken seriously, it must be understood not only as a policy challenge but as a selection problem. Policies can be rewritten. Institutions can be redesigned. But without aligning the right people with the right roles, reform will remain performative rather than transformative. For international partners, this carries an important implication: supporting reform is not only about funding programs or endorsing policies. It requires understanding the institutional logic of selection that ultimately determines whether those policies will succeed or stall. In the end, the future of reform is not decided when policies are announced, but much earlier, at the moment a system determines who is allowed to act in its name, and why that person in particular. Dr Ramy Galal is an Egyptian writer and academic specialising in public management and cultural policies. He has authored studies on cultural diplomacy, the orange economy, and restructuring Egypt’s cultural institutions. Galal holds a PHD degree from Alexandria University, a master’s degree from the University of London, and a Diploma from the University of Chile. A former senator, and former adviser and spokesperson for Egypt’s Ministry of Planning. He was also the spokesperson for the Egyptian Opposition Coalition.