After Iran and Venezuela, Kim Jong Un must decide how to handle Trump

2026-03-08 - 13:04

Last weekend, North Korean state media condemned the United States and Israel for launching a “war of aggression” against Iran, but did not report the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with dozens of members of Iran’s top leadership. That omission was not accidental. North Korea’s political system is built around the near-mythic authority and invulnerability of its leader. Publicly broadcasting the violent removal of another supreme leader would introduce a dangerous precedent. It would remind North Korean citizens that even the most powerful figure in a tightly controlled state can be tracked, targeted and eliminated. That is not a narrative Pyongyang has any incentive to circulate at home. Indeed, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may be asking himself if the time has come to pick up the phone and call US President Donald Trump. As the US and Israel press on with their military campaign that plunged the Middle East into crisis, Kim and his small circle of party and military officials who oversee national security are undoubtedly analyzing every aspect of the US military operation. And they are certainly taking note of Trump’s ability to pivot quickly from diplomacy to force. Trump is expected back in Asia later this month for a summit with China’s Xi Jinping. While there is no word of any plans for a meeting with Kim while in the region, Chad O’Carroll, founder and CEO of Korea Risk Group, a research group that closely tracks North Korea and publisher of NK News, says he would not rule it out. “(If I were Kim Jong Un) I would feel it strongly in my interest to engage in some form of talks with Trump this year, even if they’re just superficial,” O’Carroll said. O’Carroll says that logic is more about Kim managing Trump’s unpredictability. It certainly will not be lost on Kim and his inner circle that, little more than two months ago, US special forces shockingly captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. At the time, North Korea responded quickly with a missile launch that some analysts speculated could be linked to Maduro’s arrest. On Wednesday, Kim oversaw a cruise missile test from North Korea’s new Choe Hyon destroyer ahead of its commissioning, though it remains unclear whether the display of military power is linked to the war in Iran. Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae inspecting a test firing of the renewed large-caliber rocket launcher system, at an undisclosed location in North Korea, on on January 27, 2026. KCNA/KNS/AFP/ Getty Image A test firing of the renewed large-caliber rocket launcher system, at an undisclosed location in North Korea, on on January 27, 2026. KCNA/KNS/AFP/ Getty Image After the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and former President George W. Bush placed North Korea in the so-called Axis of Evil, its then leader Kim Jong Il disappeared from public view for several weeks. When he resurfaced, most of his public appearances were at military sites. “The impression (in 2003) was that there was initial fear,” says Chad O’Carroll. “The situation now, I think, is fundamentally different,” O’Carroll said. “Kim Jong Un has already made a public appearance. So he’s clearly not going into hiding.” North Korea’s Guard Command and internal security organs will now dissect every facet of the Iran operation as they attempt to ensure Kim will never share Khamenei’s fate. South Korean and US intelligence assessments have long described North Korea as maintaining one of the most elaborate leader-protection systems in the world, and Pyongyang has spent many decades refining layered protection. In recent state media footage of Kim’s public outings, security personnel are seen standing tightly clustered around him, some carrying distinctive ballistic briefcases designed to unfold into shields in the event of gunfire. During my reporting trips inside the country, I saw how Kim’s movements were closely guarded until the very last minute. I recall going through hours of exhaustive security screenings, only to see Kim’s chair remain empty at official events. Observers say Kim’s security is reinforced by familiar tactics such as decoy motorcades, sudden venue changes and layered rings of security. Hidden deep beneath Pyongyang and in the vast mountains of North Korea are believed to be extensive underground facilities and alternate command sites built to ensure safety and continuity of leadership during moments of crisis. Kim has many reasons to be more confident today than his father was in 2003. North Korea is widely believed to have assembled dozens of nuclear warheads, a reality that fundamentally changes the strategic equation. Unlike Iran or Venezuela (or Libya, for that matter), North Korea claims to possess operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of reaching anywhere in the mainland United States, although they have never been fully tested. It’s been several years since Pyongyang codified the right to preemptive nuclear use into law and declared its nuclear status “irreversible.” North Korea’s aging but formidable artillery force is still aimed squarely at Seoul, as it has been for decades. O’Carroll told me North Korea’s ability to place “tactical or even strategic nuclear warheads” on its missiles fundamentally alters any adversary’s risk calculus. But he adds deterrence does not guarantee immunity. Recent conflicts have shown how deeply modern intelligence services can still penetrate adversaries, identify leadership targets, disrupt communications, and suppress defenses with speed. The events surrounding Iran may also revive an uncomfortable memory for Kim: Hanoi. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves before his special train leaves Vietnam’s Dong Dang station on March 2, 2019. Kyodo News/Getty Images A special train carrying North Korean leader Kim Jong Un leaves Vietnam’s Dong Dang station on March 2, 2019. Kyodo News/Getty Images In February 2019, we watched as Kim arrived in Vietnam by armored train for his second summit with Trump, beaming with confidence that in hindsight seems almost naive. North Korean officials, according to sources I spoke with at the time, believed a deal was close. Kim “did not have a backup plan,” one source told me. The domestic propaganda buildup framed the summit as a breakthrough before it began. The lunch table was set. Snow fish and banoffee pie were on the menu. But when Trump and his team abruptly walked away without a deal or joint statement, the lunch table sat empty, and Kim left Hanoi empty-handed. Last year, The New York Times reported that during that same period of high-level engagement, US Navy SEALs allegedly carried out a covert mission inside North Korea to plant a listening device ahead of the summit. The operation reportedly went awry and resulted in civilian deaths. The US government has not publicly confirmed the account, and CNN has not independently verified it. If accurate, it would underscore a hard reality: diplomacy does not suspend intelligence gathering or contingency planning. Iran appears to have experienced a similar pattern, with talks underway even as military pressure mounted and intelligence about the movements of Iran’s top leadership was quietly gathered. When negotiations stalled, overwhelming and deadly force followed, seemingly taking the Iranians by surprise. The lesson for Kim is that diplomacy does not eliminate the risk of confrontation. After Hanoi, Kim regrouped and recalibrated. Engagement with Washington gradually faded and weapons testing eventually resumed, accelerating during President Joe Biden’s term. Then came Kim’s decisive pivot toward Moscow. As Russia’s war in Ukraine reshaped alignments and deepened Moscow’s isolation in the West, Pyongyang seized the opportunity and Kim met twice with Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, strengthening what both nations now call a mutually beneficial and transactional “strategic partnership.” Kim agreed to supply artillery shells and rockets and deployed thousands of troops to support Russia’s war effort. In return, analysts say Pyongyang has received food, fuel and potentially sensitive military technology, along with battlefield data that helps North Korea refine its weapons. Even formal partnerships have their limits. On paper, North Korea holds a mutual defense treaty with Russia – as well as with China, with which it also maintains longstanding economic ties. But Iran’s regime also cultivated strong ties with both nuclear powers. Tehran formalized long-term strategic agreements with both Beijing and Moscow. Yet when the latest crisis escalated, neither nation intervened militarily. Some believe that reality could bring Kim back to at least considering the idea of reengaging with Trump. Their relationship has always been unusually personal. In Singapore in 2018, Kim and Trump took a private garden stroll and even compared armored limousines. Trump later spoke glowingly of the “beautiful letters” Kim sent him and famously said at a rally, “We fell in love.” North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un walks to greet US President Donald Trump at the Military Demarcation Line that divides North and South Korea, in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized zone (DMZ) on June 30, 2019. Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images Kim evolved in Trump’s rhetoric from “Little Rocket Man” to “my friend.” In April of 2019, during their last known meeting, Trump became the first sitting US president to step onto North Korean soil at the Korean demilitarized zone. For a time, Kim featured prominently in Trump’s foreign policy narrative, as part of a diplomatic style that often places personal rapport at the center of statecraft. But in Trump’s most recent State of the Union address, North Korea was not mentioned. For a president who often frames diplomacy in personal terms, being outside that narrative can introduce a different kind of uncertainty for Kim. At North Korea’s Ninth Workers’ Party Congress in late February, Kim left a narrow opening for talks with Washington, linking any reset in relations to US acceptance of North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state. Kim said there was “no reason” the two countries “cannot get along well,” but only if the United States withdraws what he calls its “hostile policy” and respects North Korea’s nuclear status as laid out in its constitution. In the days that followed, South Korea’s foreign ministry said the White House reaffirmed that the United States remains open to dialogue with North Korea without preconditions. Nobody knows if or when talks will resume. But after recent events, Kim must be asking himself which option is riskier: calling Trump or choosing to stay silent.